It's not just the stall-detection failure that's concerning.
The thing about the engine change is that the engines chosen -- also in a "save money, avoid long development" way are what makes the 737 MAX unstable; the airframe is not meant to have that much drag in those places.
Boeing was getting away with this by stating that they'd solved it in software and implying that there was US military secret sauce in there to make the -- insanely challenging! -- software problem one they could have solved in that span of time for that much money. It was believable; Boeing has had a very friendly relationship with the DoD. As it comes out that the software was a complete disaster as a development process, the expectation that the aircraft will work at all in a "safe to operate" sense is lost.
Can't think of anybody who has recovered from this kind of thing in the commercial aviation field.
no subject
It's not just the stall-detection failure that's concerning.
The thing about the engine change is that the engines chosen -- also in a "save money, avoid long development" way are what makes the 737 MAX unstable; the airframe is not meant to have that much drag in those places.
Boeing was getting away with this by stating that they'd solved it in software and implying that there was US military secret sauce in there to make the -- insanely challenging! -- software problem one they could have solved in that span of time for that much money. It was believable; Boeing has had a very friendly relationship with the DoD. As it comes out that the software was a complete disaster as a development process, the expectation that the aircraft will work at all in a "safe to operate" sense is lost.
Can't think of anybody who has recovered from this kind of thing in the commercial aviation field.