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thewayneBoth from Bruce Schneier.
The paper purports that you can read a 4096 bit GnuPG RSA key through acoustic monitoring of the computer that's doing a decryption. It also talks about measuring the electrical potential of the actual computer chassis as a low-bandwidth attack. Strange stuff.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/acoustic_crypta.html
The other day a Harvard student emailed in multiple bomb threats to avoid taking a final exam. Idiot. He was mildly clever in that he used an anonymous email account and used Tor, his epic fail was that he used Tor within the Harvard campus network, so they could easily identify IP addresses and locations of people using Tor and at what time, so it wasn't difficult to nab him.
If he had used Tor from coffee shops off-campus, they would have had a much tougher time tracking him down.
Schneier has a great comment: "This is one of the problems of using a rare security tool. The very thing that gives you plausible deniability also makes you the most likely suspect. The FBI didn't have to break Tor; they just used conventional police mechanisms to get Kim to confess."
I think this might adversely affect his academic standing.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/tor_user_identi.html
The paper purports that you can read a 4096 bit GnuPG RSA key through acoustic monitoring of the computer that's doing a decryption. It also talks about measuring the electrical potential of the actual computer chassis as a low-bandwidth attack. Strange stuff.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/acoustic_crypta.html
The other day a Harvard student emailed in multiple bomb threats to avoid taking a final exam. Idiot. He was mildly clever in that he used an anonymous email account and used Tor, his epic fail was that he used Tor within the Harvard campus network, so they could easily identify IP addresses and locations of people using Tor and at what time, so it wasn't difficult to nab him.
If he had used Tor from coffee shops off-campus, they would have had a much tougher time tracking him down.
Schneier has a great comment: "This is one of the problems of using a rare security tool. The very thing that gives you plausible deniability also makes you the most likely suspect. The FBI didn't have to break Tor; they just used conventional police mechanisms to get Kim to confess."
I think this might adversely affect his academic standing.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/tor_user_identi.html
no subject
Date: 2013-12-21 05:25 am (UTC)And bomb threats to get out of exams? Seems a bit crude for Harvard.