I'm not going to talk about 9/11

[thewayne]

It's a personal experience and I don't feel the need to share. I was fortunate: I didn't lose anyone in the attacks and no one in my immediate circle of friends did either, though an acquaintance had a ticket to go to the observation deck on one of the WTC towers and would have been killed had she not overslept.

I have only two things to say. First, my wife is flying home today! That deserves a bit w00t! She'll be home in 12-13 hours or so, she's been gone about two weeks: she flew to Ohio, picked up her mom, then drove to Maine to see her sister who just turned 50.

It'll be good to have my wife home again.

Second, yesterday the New York Times posted a story called 10 Ways To Avoid The Next 9/11. One of the people who was interviewed but later cut because of space was Bruce Schneir. Here's what he wrote:

Despite what you see in the movies and on television, it’s actually very difficult to execute a major terrorist act. It’s hard to organize, plan, and execute an attack, and it’s all too easy to slip up and get caught. Combine that with our intelligence work tracking terrorist cells and interdicting terrorist funding, and you have a climate where major attacks are rare. In many ways, the success of 9/11 was an anomaly; there were many points where it could have failed. The main reason we haven’t seen another 9/11 is that it isn’t as easy as it looks. Much of our counterterrorist efforts are nothing more than security theater: ineffectual measures that look good. Forget the “war on terror”; the difficulty isn’t killing or arresting the terrorists, it’s finding them. Terrorism is a law enforcement problem, and needs to be treated as such. For example, none of our post-9/11 airline security measures would have stopped the London shampoo bombers. The lesson of London is that our best defense is intelligence and investigation. Rather than spending money on airline security, or sports stadium security -- measures that require us to guess the plot correctly in order to be effective -- we’re better off spending money on measures that are effective regardless of the plot.

Intelligence and investigation have kept us safe from terrorism in the past, and will continue to do so in the future. If the CIA and FBI had done a better job of coordinating and sharing data in 2001, 9/11 would have been another failed attempt. Coordination has gotten better, and those agencies are better funded -- but it’s still not enough. Whenever you read about the billions being spent on national ID cards or massive data mining programs or new airport security measures, think about the number of intelligence agents that the same money could buy. That’s where we’re going to see the greatest return on our security investment.

Maybe some day people will start listening to what he's saying.

Comments

[deborak]

My cousin was killed at WTC. About him.

[thewayne.livejournal.com]

Sorry to hear it, Deb, I stand corrected. Interesting that he was also there in '93, a lot of people don't remember that attack.

[apostate-96.livejournal.com]

Sounds right-on to me. Trying to put security measures in place to stop 'em from doing one certain plot is a losing game, 'cause eventually we'll guess wrong and they'll get through again. And the "random security checks" have turned into a joke, as they've often ended up harrassing people who're in the very low risk range of folks to try to blow up a plane (or whatever). It's also arguable that the more we cut back our own freedoms, the more they've managed to score with terrorist actions.

I think I've read one or two other of his articles that you've posted links to, and he strikes me as someone who's quite sharp and knows his shit. Too bad more people aren't listening to him. Then again, too many politicians want something big and flashy that'll show they're doing "something," rather than being willing to support more quiet measures that may not show up as much (and help them maintain popularity for re-electino) but are more likely to actually work.

[vaudy.livejournal.com]

harrassing people who're in the very low risk range of folks to try to blow up a plane

I was pegged for a random security check when I moved home a few years ago because, I think, I was flying on a one-way ticket. I am the most harmless-looking, WASP-y looking, little white girl you've ever seen. "Harassed" is probably not quite the right word, but I sure didn't appreciate waiting in line three times longer than most of the people moving through security and getting the full security treatment.

[thewayne.livejournal.com]

Yep. One-way tickets are pretty much a guarantee that you'll be stopped. So is paying cash for a ticket.

[apostate-96.livejournal.com]

I can see that. I also can't help remembering the 80+ year old woman who was given the full security treatment 'cause she had knitting needles with her. Definitely an agent of the Jihad!

[thewayne.livejournal.com]

Not to mention people whose names are similar to those on the watch list -- a list based ENTIRELY on names! Senator Ted Kennedy is on that list, I think as long as he's not flying the plane with a female co-pilot that it's probably reasonably safe.

There was an 80+ y/o grandma whose name appeared on a watch list and she was given the 3rd degree whenever she flew.

I'm waiting for a terrorist to change his name to John Smith.

[apostate-96.livejournal.com]

I'm waiting for a terrorist to change his name to John Smith.

If it was instead to "Joseph Smith," then he could do a good job of fucking with the LDS people, too!

Seriously, though, some of the so-called precautions that've been taken are ludicrous and a serious waste of time and money. We can do better.

[silveradept]

Amen. For once, investing in things that might actually get the job done, rather than wasting money on wars and security theater, would have been the right thing to do. And I would hope that the people would be smart enough to realize that "hey, now that we have more people who can speak these languages and ferret out plots, we're actually a bit safer!"

It's too bad the people in charge went for show rather than effectiveness.

[magic-rat.livejournal.com]

Bruce Schneir raises valid points, but I've always thought that the problem with effective counter-terrorism is that when it's successful, nobody notices because life just goes on as usual. For example, when the terrorism warning level rises, the news media and thus the public speculates about what's going on. Then the warning level drops with nothing apparent happening, and we don't know if the warning was false or if the CIA/FBI took the appropriate measures to prevent whatever was about to happen. After a while, everyone ignores the boy crying, "Wolf!".

I think that the biggest problem that Schneir is fighting against is that individuals can be smart, but people as a whole are stupid. The War on Terror is beginning to remind me of the War on Drugs: flashy news bites to keep the people happy and to justify the budget, but nothing substantial in really combatting the problem.